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Abstract 
 
In a state of voluntary trance or meditation, the perception of reality appears to extend beyond 
the usual and temporal boundaries that are normally perceived by the sense organs. It is argued 
that the problems of validity and reliability of trance experiences for scientific discourse are in 
principle no different than the problems associated with ordinary perception. The shift in early 
Greek philosophy from myth to and emphasis on logos (reason) has led to a neglect of those 
subtle qualities of reason that were considered to be gateways for divine revelation. Scientific 
methodologies cannot account for such revelation, and there are no criteria known to science that 
would enable people to utilize these phenomena. Shamanic experiences are intersubjectively 
accessible and provide data that is suitable for the construction of rational theories if appropriate 
methodologies are developed. However, for a scientist, shamanic experiences are considered at 
most to be psychological ones, and consequently without any value for empirical research. This 
article examines the possibility of reevaluating the terms “rational” and “consciousness,” in order 
to expand scientific methodologies in such a way that volitionally altered perceptions of reality 
can be integrated into scientific research. 
Philosophical inquiry utilizing the phenomenon of trance appears to be a misnomer. How could 
one approach such a topic with the traditional tools of philosophical investigation in an area that 
appears to defy reason?i This article supports the belief that scientific research can include 
knowledge gained through trance. After all, since the Greeks, philosophers emphasize the 
importance of critical thought as well as empirical reasonable ways of understanding reality. The 
present author will argue that experiences achieved in a shamanic state of trance are 
intersubjectively accessible and thus enlarge the scope of the scholar’s collection of empirical 
data that is suitable for rational communication. Thus, the function of trance within a theory of 
knowledge is the experience of subtle structures of reality. The problems of the validity and 
reliability of such trance experiences in principle are no different than the problems associated 
with the assessment of ordinary perception. I suggest that a reevaluation of the term “rational” is 
necessary. 
In 1890, when the English Society for Psychical Research carried out a large scale “Census of 
Hallucinations,” 9.9 percent of the 17,000 subjects had at some time in their lives experienced at 
least one hallucination not accounted for by illness, intoxication or any of the commonly 
recognized causes. In 1948, these findings were confirmed by the same society in a smaller 
follow-up study (West 1948). These studies referred to “sane” people in a normal environment. 
What can one learn, if these altered perceptions are to be systematically explored in a scientific 
setting? Within the context of contemporary theories of knowledge, altered perceptions (such as 
those which occur in trance) are not believed to exist. Rather, they are considered unsuitable for 
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scientific explanations because of their lack of intersubjective accessibility. Experiences 
achieved in a state of trance or meditation, or under the influence of divinatory hallucinogens do 
not qualify for so-called real scientific research, and are considered to be only private 
experiences. However, a shamanic flight or a conscious form of trance can be an additional 
“door of perception” (Huxley 1963) that is suitable for scientific investigation, if one is able to 
establish an appropriate methodology to utilize such information.  
Human perception is fallible; thus, in the sciences, emphasis is given to technology and 
instrumentation to more easily control and measure data by means of logic and mathematics. 
Certainly, reliance on material aids in the study of perception does not necessarily provide 
sufficient information about additional possible perceptions, such as those available from 
conscious states of trance. The epistemological value of unusual perceptions at present is not 
recognized within scientific methodologies, because these states do not fit into the framework 
provided by these accepted approaches. 
A lively discussion concerning the possibility of combining different epistemological viewpoints 
took place in the 1960’s and 1970’s, when the concept of incommensurability was addressed 
(Feyerabend 1975). This theory is based on the assumption that certain rival theories are 
mutually incompatible. Such incompatibility might also effect the change from an established 
theory or paradigm (according to Kuhn 1962), to a new form of conceptualization and theorizing 
about reality. Feyerabend recommended the adoption of a pluralistic methodology in which such 
alternate views that have failed in their competitive bid with rational thought can be improved 
rather than discarded. Today these concerns no longer are fashionable, and exactly the opposite 
viewpoint is supported. Pluralism in philosophy is no longer popular, and there is little 
motivation to consider the possibility of integrating different epistemological points of view. 
Academic philosophy, just like scientific research, is increasingly subjected to utilitarian and 
pragmatic justifications rather than reflecting a genuine interest and concern for the unknown. 
 
The Greek Philosophic Inheritance 
 
The shift from a mythological interpretation of reality to a purely rational one is considered to be 
the main achievement of our Greek intellectual heritage. As early as the fifth century B.C., 
Ionian philosophers distinguished between knowledge and belief. Xenophanes, although a deeply 
religious man, pointed out that there is a significant difference between faith and knowledge 
(Dodds 1951: 181). He denied the validity of divination and demonstrated his belief that one 
could analyze different attempts to give a true account of the gods. “No man has ever had, or 
ever will have sure knowledge about Gods; even if he should chance to hit on the exact truth, he 
cannot know that he has done so, though we can all have our opinions.” 
There is a common problem with divinatory knowledge, trance, or hallucinations; namely that of 
proof. The problem of proof starts not with visionary or hallucinatory experiences, but with 
ordinary perception that is obtainable through the five senses. The philosopher Parmenides 
cautioned “not to trust the senses, but instead to judge by reason” (Guthrie 1965: 25): “For the 
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first time sense and reason are contrasted, and we are told that the senses deceive and that reason 
alone is to be trusted.” 
The insistence upon the dominance of reason as a more reliable tool to hypothesize about reality 
also changed the perceptions of the world. Dependency on the gods decreased and a more 
autonomous existence for humankind became reasonable. With this transformation from myth to 
logic, a drastic change in attitude towards divinatory perception also took place. As a 
consequence, science distanced itself from those mythic forms of knowledge for the same 
reasons that were brought forth against religion. 
The practice of altered states of consciousness used to take place within the context of 
communication with the divine. Its relevancy for human beings decreased as they became more 
independent from their gods. However, divinatory perception does not necessarily have to be 
interpreted as communication with the gods. Rather, it can be seen as a meticulously refined 
perception made possible through the complexity of the human nervous system, in combination 
with a volitional effort. Furthermore, it has been argued that such perception could allow the 
individual to perceive energetic frequencies of reality (Bohm 1981) as opposed to ordinary 
physical objects that are regularly perceived through the five senses. 
While the concern of early Greek philosophers about the inaccuracy of sense perception has been 
widely accepted within science, little recognition is given to those early Greek warnings that 
human thought (reason) also could suffer similar limitations. Alcmaeon of Croton and 
Heraclitus, in particular, reported the limitations of human thought (Guthrie 1965). Although 
little information is available about Alcmaeon, there are some fragments preserved that specify 
his view (Wilbur & Allen 1979: 229): “Concerning things mortal, the gods have certainty, 
whereas to us as men, conjecture only is possible.” Divine wisdom is still considered to be 
superior to the ability of human understanding. With the increasing acceptance of logos as the 
divine part of human beings themselves, the superiority of the gods slowly became subject to 
doubt. The Greek noun logos is derived from the verb lego, which means “I say” (Kerferd 1972: 
83). Within the context of philosophy, logos is understood as a guiding principle of human 
nature; the term is normally translated as “reason,” without clearly differentiating whether 
human or divine reason is addressed. Additionally, logos is opposed to mythos. Together, the 
terms describe the two poles of intellectual activity: One is conceptual and combines and 
analyzes, and the other is pictorial and creates from the unconscious (Nestle 1966). 
The divine character of logos, however, was recognized by Heraclitus (ca. 500-460 B.C.) 
(Wilbur & Allen 1979: 64, 71): “Human nature has no power of understanding; but the divine 
nature has it.” (Fragment 78); “Most of what is divine escapes recognition through unbelief.” 
(Fragment 86); “Therefore one must follow ... that which is common to all. But although the 
logos is universal, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves” 
(Fragment 2); “The soul has its own logos, which increases itself (i.e., grows according to its 
needs).” (Fragment 115). Heraclitus’ glorification of logos as a divine structure which permeates 
the cosmos has to be seen in its larger cosmological context. For him, at least three ideas are 
expressed through logos (Kerferd 1972: 83): “… human thought about the universe, the rational 
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structure of the universe itself, and the source of that rational structure.” 
Two millennia later, human beings themselves are capable of understanding the complexity of 
reality through logos, which had become a synonym for rational, logical thinking. Contemporary 
science, however, does not combine these three concepts (conceptualization, reason, and 
metaphysics). To simply substitute the divine qualities of logos with rational and logical 
reasoning does not do justice to the metaphysical basis and origin of the term “logos.” Both 
human thought about the universe and any metaphysical considerations about the origins of the 
universe had to be eliminated in order to support the exclusive logical-mathematical analysis of 
reality. 
Thus, it seems that the subtle quality of logos that was a link between the gods and man has been 
eliminated. According to Heraclitus (Fragments 2 and 78), logos is simply the universal law that 
is within the reach of human nature. The divine elements of logos that could be understood as a 
result of a volitional effort (Fragment 115) were rejected as part of the secularization process 
(Fragment 86). 
The modern disinclination to utilize this knowledge outside the realm of mythos (subsumed as an 
additional element of logos) led to an artificial exclusion of the subtle qualities of logos from 
scientific applications. These qualities were only accepted within the context of mythical thought 
and as such were viewed as inferior to logical research. A typical description of the supposed 
differences between mythical and logical thought can be found in Snell’s classic book, The 
Discovery of the Mind (1982: 224): “Mythical thought requires receptivity; logic cannot exist 
without activity. Logic does not materialize until man has become cognizant of the energy within 
him, and the individuality of his mind. Logical thought is unimpaired wakefulness; mythical 
thinking borders upon the dream, in which images and ideas float by without being controlled by 
the will. As far as the enlightened intellect is concerned, myth is ‘unnatural,’ and that means 
above all that it is not free of contradiction.” 
This typical example of misrepresentation of the subtle qualities of logos reflects scientists’ 
prejudices against such perception which reaches beyond the limits of a material representation 
of reality. Snell obviously confused mythical thought with folk tales. He does not recognize that 
mythical thought requires both receptivity and activity. The state of trance in which mythos 
plants the seed of knowledge is not a state of sleepy existence and dreams. Rather, it is the 
opposite, a state of extreme concentration and willpower. Myth becomes unnatural and 
contradictory only if a state of high concentration and willpower cannot be maintained by an 
individual. A scientist willing to bring divinatory knowledge into scholarly research must 
maintain the same integrity as any other scientist would bring to a selected field of competency. 
For example, Tart’s work on state-specific sciences (1975), which is discussed below, 
exemplifies this approach. 
It is still an unresolved epistemologic question as to whether these so-called irrational elements 
are truly outside or beyond reason or logos. All that can be said so far is that a satisfactory 
methodology has not yet been found that provides a successful tool to systematically integrate 
such elements into a theory of knowledge.ii Divinatory knowledge is a challenge to the 
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materialistic world view of the humanities, a challenge that is not expressed in the opposition of 
religion versus science, but rather in the opposition of an energetic-wave world view as opposed 
to a micro-physical world view (Bohm 1981). 
There is no indication of any major quarrel between science and religion in ancient Greece. At 
that time, science was embedded within the general field of philosophy. The metaphysical 
attempts to answer the question “What is reality?” led to both materialistic and immaterialistic 
concepts of reality. It became important to postulate a world behind appearances, that is, 
explanatory models and theories about reality were developed in order to find the ultimate 
principles according to which reality functioned. 
This philosophical search was supported through science and religion. The pre-Socratic turn in 
philosophy (ca. 600-500 B.C.) made a religious interpretation of the world unacceptable. The 
world behind appearances could no longer be filled with theological concepts of explanation. 
Instead, the new concepts relied on logos as the ultimate principle to explain reality. In spite of 
the demise of theological concepts, room for religious experiences to illuminate our 
understanding of reality still existed (Rohde 1972: 363): “It might seem as if religion and 
philosophy were not merely different but dealt with different provinces of reality, and thus even 
strict and philosophically minded thinkers could honestly and without imagining disloyalty to 
philosophy, adopt particular and even fundamental conceptions from the creed of their fathers, 
and allow them to grow side by side and at peace with their own philosophical ideas.” 
In particular, it was the individual’s religious experience that enabled a communication with and 
conscious perception of subtle elements of reality. For example, the Orphic and Bacchic 
initiation mysteries were based on the assumption (Rohde 1972: 342) that “man’s duty is to free 
himself from the chains of the body in which the soul lies fast bound like the prisoner in his 
cell.” In an ecstatic-cathartic ritual of purification the conscious psyche was believed able to 
perceive its original form of existence and thus the individual would empirically experience this 
subtle reality. 
If we were to understand such so-called irrational elements, one might be able to integrate new 
and valuable information into science. The simple fact that a methodology has not been found 
that allows humankind to utilize altered perception for scientific research does not mean that 
such perception is beyond reason (in its more complex meaning similar to logos). According to 
Dodd (1951: 269), “What we need is not to abandon reason, but simply to recognize that reason 
in the last three centuries has worked within a field which is not the whole of experience, that it 
has mistaken the part for the whole, and imposed arbitrary limits on its own working.” Whether 
reason is a quality of consciousness or simply a logical constituent of theories should not effect 
the accumulation of empirical data. However, it will certainly effect their interpretation. 
 
The Volitional Perception of Unusual Phenomena 
 
In order to successfully integrate the concept of trance into systematic scientific research, the 
function of consciousness for human beings must be clarified. Theories of consciousness reflect 
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the metaphysical assumptions underlying any methodical research. A description or specification 
of consciousness within philosophy is limited by the efficacy of the theories involved. The 
description of consciousness within the natural sciences, however, is based on the observation of 
phenomena. Such observations, in turn, are based on two major conditions: (1) they are limited 
by the theoretical framework in which they occur; and (2) they control the applicability of a 
theory. 
With regard to consciousness research, the means of observation are rather limited. Since one 
does not directly observe the objects perceived in trance, one can only infer from three sources of 
information: behavior, language, and physico-chemical reactions. These sources do not provide 
any direct data about consciousness and are simply the basis for speculative interpretation. It is 
not surprising that in the course of the history of philosophy, many hypotheses about 
consciousness have been developed that are entirely different from each other and sometimes 
even contradictory to one other (Bunge 1980). 
One of the fundamental problems with regard to consciousness is the relationship between mind 
and body. Is the mind simply part of a universal consciousness? Can the mind actually control 
the brain? Or is consciousness rather a complex function of the brain? No matter which position 
one chooses, it will be either a variation of the dualistic or the monistic interpretation of the 
mind/body problem.1 Many contemporary theories, which at first glance appear to be outside the 
limitations of reductionism, do not fulfill their potential promise. For example, there are theories 
based on cybernetics where a general 1:1 correspondence is considered to exist between physical 
and mental states. They can be explained through an analysis of cortical processes within the 
context of knowledge-based systems (George 1986), or within the context of folk psychology 
(Churchland 1988), or of holographic structures (Bohm 1981). In the final analysis, all these 
theories are a form of reductive materialism, even though their rationale seems to provide the 
answers to the perennial mind-body controversy. 
Research about trance and shamanism requires an awareness of the philosophical consequences 
of a writer’s approach – materialistic or idealistic – with regard to the function of consciousness. 
Such awareness or knowledge is a vital prerequisite to evaluate information that may have to be 
considered for a theory of trance. This can be explained by briefly discussing some aspects of a 
recent popular book which addresses some philosophical issues about consciousness. 
In her book Neurophilosophy, Churchland (1988) introduces her interpretation of the general 
problem of consciousness and the mind-brain discussion within the context of “folk 
psychology.” Her description of folk psychology falsely suggests that this theory provides a 
larger understanding of human consciousness, in which scientific research is used to illuminate 
the intellectual potential of humankind.iii This example will illustrate that the exact opposite 
situation is the case. Churchland has no room for consciousness in folk psychology. The 
                                                 
1 Dualistic concepts assume two separate qualities of reality, a physical and a mental realm. Monistic theories are 
either materialistic (and do not consider the possibility of an independent mind), or they are idealistic (and consider 
an independent quality which is the basis for all manifestations of the physical or mental world). For an excellent 
overview see Bunge (1980). 
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“hominess” that she is talking about turns out to be the potential for an artificial manufacturing 
of “consciousness” within scientific laboratories. Churchland (p. 299) uses an entire array of 
success-wordsiv in order to describe the “homey” features of folk-psychology (the term in itself 
is a suggestive word): “Folk-psychology is commonsense psychology - the psychological lore in 
virtue of which we explain behavior as the outcome of beliefs, desires, perceptions, expectations, 
goals, sensations, and so forth. [Folk-psychology is] ‘intuitive psychology,’ and it shapes our 
conceptions of ourselves” [emphasis added]. 
The connotative properties of these emphasized words suggest that folk psychology supports a 
humanistic approach to concerns about the mind-brain problem in which neuropsychology is 
used to describe the concept of our mind. However, later in her book, Churchland indicates that 
folk psychology has to be seen from the general context of eliminative materialism. She 
cautioned the reader (p. 396) that “the mind-brain is exceedingly complex, and it seems unlikely 
that primitive folk would have lit upon the correct theoretical framework to explain its nature” 
[emphasis added]. In order to emphasize the complexity of the mind-brain problem, Churchland 
downgrades the usefulness of “folk” and introduces the importance of “expert” knowledge. She 
saw such expert knowledge in “eliminative materialism,” which she incorrectly described (p. 
396) as the view that holds: “(1) that folk psychology is a theory, (2) that it is a theory whose 
inadequacies entail that it must eventually be substantially revised or replaced outright (hence 
‘eliminative’); and (3) that what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the conceptual 
framework of a matured neuroscience (hence ‘materialism’).” 
In philosophy, eliminative materialism is characterized as a monistic position according to which 
reality can be strictly explained solely in terms of physical properties. There are no mental 
properties different from the material world and there is no room for consciousness as a distinct 
feature of reality. Eliminative materialism is in the tradition of Watson’s and Skinner’s 
behaviorism.  
Certainly, folk psychology goes far beyond these original concepts and considers the results of 
contemporary neuro-science. Churchland’s interpretation and application of such results, 
however, is within a reductionist materialistic ideology. Within such a theory, awareness no 
longer exists (p. 309): “... there may be no such thing as awareness ... Folk psychology may be a 
thoroughly muddled theory of mental business, and a newer and better theory may yield a 
theoretically more satisfactory characterization of it. What is it? Well, whatever it is that we now, 
perhaps mistakenly, characterize as awareness, which some future theory may characterize in a 
quite different way.” 
Churchland’s choice of success-words to describe folk psychology suggests a humanistic 
treatment of mind/body problems. It appears that she is genuinely concerned to avoid the 
philosophic implications of materialistic reductionism. However, once the properties of the 
words “awareness” and “consciousness” are eliminated from the conceptualization of reality, we 
can also eliminate a self-motivating initiator of human action which is called free will. 
For Churchland, such a principal readiness to accept reductionist claims is apparent, for example, 
when she introduces the concept of “cognitive software.” Metaphorically speaking, she claims 
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that the brain can be understood as a computer. Churchland hopes that such metaphors will 
eventually catalyze theorizing. However, it becomes clear that the intended theories will fit a 
reductionist frame of interpretation. 
Contrary to the suggestive power of the descriptive terms for folk psychology, it becomes clear 
that its rationale is based on a scientistic reductionism in which behavior and psychoneurological 
processes in the last analysis can be explained through physical determinism. In this context, the 
terms “physical determinism” and “physical” are used in the manner defined by Feigl (1967: 10): 
“‘Physical determinism’ [is] that degree of precise and specific in-principle-predictability that 
even modern quantum physics would allow as regards the macro- and some of the micro-
processes in organisms. ‘Physical’ [is] the type of concepts and laws which suffice in principle 
for the explanation and prediction of inorganic processes.” This example should demonstrate that 
the convincing connotation of success-words does not necessarily have to correlate with the 
underlying ideologies of a theory. The inclusion of awareness and consciousness within the 
claims and surveillance of reductionist methodologies has become a critical issue affecting the 
quality of life of future generations, and places one squarely back in a Skinnerian world beyond 
freedom and dignity. Scientific freedom permits us, nevertheless, to develop equally strong 
theories of consciousness apart from the reductionist movement of scientism. 
In spite of the difficulties in defining the properties of the terms “consciousness” and 
“awareness,” and in spite of the reductionist claims mentioned above, these terms will be used in 
the present article in such a way as to represent properties that cannot be reproduced by artificial 
neuronal firing. Both terms stand for an arbitrarily imposed grid on mental processes. The 
function of consciousness and awareness in human communication is still unclear. 
The conscious observation of subtle (energetic) reality could bring forth the necessary empirical 
data to develop challenging theories of mind that would be an acceptable alternative to scientific 
reductionism. Throughout history, and in all cultures, the concept of soul or psyche that is 
disembodied and able to travel through time and space has been perennially discussed. This 
article neither overviews that corpus of material nor argues the opposite reductionist-materialistic 
approach. Rather, it is an attempt to shed some light on the philosophic and scientific 
applicability of trance or other ASC for epistemologic analysis. 
The function of trance or ASC within a theory of knowledge is, at best, the immediate experience 
of subtle structures of reality in an intersubjectively reproducible way. Thus it might allow one to 
acquire additional conscious perception of reality suitable to enhance one’s structural knowledge 
of the physical world. There is little hope that the essential differences between the concepts of 
the physical sciences and the concepts of introspective-phenomenological psychology can be 
solved merely by including trance in scientific research. The first function of trance within 
science simply is the opening of an additional “door of perception” to provide new raw data that 
is suitable for scientific analysis. 
The subject of trance has been researched extensively in anthropology and ethnopsychiatry. 
Shamanic trance is very often initiated by hallucinogens, alcohol or tobacco. It requires a high 
level of concentration to maintain awareness under the influence of strong doses of certain 
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psychoactive drugs. There are various techniques and exercises that seem to improve one’s 
ability to concentrate. A vital prerequisite for a successful trance is the ability to interfere 
actively and with awareness with the mental imagery that accompanies the state of trance 
(LaBerge 1988; Peters & Price-Williams 1983). 
Trance is generally considered to be passage into another state of consciousness. In a critical 
analysis of shamanism, Peters and Price-Williams (1980) pointed out that an important 
psychological criterion for distinguishing shamanic ecstasy from other types of trance is the 
factor of mastery and control. A shaman is not simply victimized by the trance but also has (1) 
voluntary control of entrancement and the duration of trance, at least once the shaman has left 
novice status; (2) posttrance memory; and (3) transic communicative interplay with spectators. 
As to the content of a shaman’s trance, there are essential schemata of visionary travel from at 
least three up to 33 levels or “cosmic zones” in which the shaman interacts with “spirits” (Noll 
1985). 
No scientific satisfaction is gained if such spirits were interpreted merely as entities of a 
preternatural world. Rather, a conceptual model should be maintained in which the data 
perceived in ASC represent a different dimension of reality. Also, it is reasonable to assume that 
a shamanic vision will be bound to the level of imagination, knowledge, and experience of the 
individual shaman. Often, a shaman’s trance is influenced by visions that are perceived in 
different cultures as from the nether realms or as guardian spirits. There is no doubt that a 
demonic or guardian vision is a memorable experience for an individual; however, the 
challenging question is the function of such an image during a shamanic flight. Is such a vision 
due to a psychological problem of the individual or is it a control mechanism to heighten 
awareness and as such, a hurdle signaling a shift in consciousness? 
Visionary experiences very seldom take place in a scientifically controlled environment. It 
appears as if one party is not interested in communicating within an unsuitable, because 
consciousness and awareness are individual private properties and as such are not suitable for 
external manipulations. Certainly, this does not refer to communication between humans and 
gods or spirits. If the concept of communication still applies here, it is a volitional interaction 
between human beings and such subtle structures of reality that are neither bound by 
macrophysical laws nor dependent on the concept of time. Both of these variables are necessary 
frameworks in scientific observation. If human consciousness substantially influences the 
process of data-gathering, then scientific methodologies will have to reconsider those axioms of 
science that exclude the possibility of consciousness. 
This does not mean that such consciousness data are outside the physical realm. One must not 
forget that the context in which the term “metaphysics” was formulated, belonged to a time in 
which knowledge of physics was entirely different. With respect to the radical changes of our 
knowledge of physics, a new definition for metaphysical or so-called supernatural events also 
appears to be appropriate. Such events might be considered energetic potentials of reality 
different from their manifestation as matter. 
Generally it can be assumed that a shift of consciousness is initiated through so-called energy 
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centers (Mindell 1982). Furthermore, one may assume that there is a psycho-physical correlation 
to increase awareness or to change a state of consciousness. The conscious activation of energy 
centers (also called chakras) is supposed to change the perception of reality. Chakras may be 
directly connected with the endocrine system and certain ganglionic cells of the sympathetic 
nervous system. The energy centers may be embedded in the somatic sensory system and could 
be capable of activating the chemical messengers used by a nerve cell. A scientist could 
recognize the activity of a chakra, for example, by analyzing the active state of an endocrine cell, 
or by activating a plexus, and gather data about electromagnetic changes in specific areas of the 
physical body. Such functions could be controlled empirically. 
By changing the supposed activity of an energy center, the resultant activity of an endocrine cell 
or the activation of a plexus could be directly influenced. In this context, chakras would be 
considered the basic energetic switchboards of the physical body with regard to its environment. 
Different activities of chakras, thus, would represent different frequencies of energy. Their 
activation would depend on stimuli that are only partially recognized within science. The 
seemingly vital part outside the methods of science is the participation of consciousness and 
awareness. 
Once the possibility is accepted, that there are mechanisms to manipulate the frequency of a 
chakra, definite themes could be recognized in most esoteric traditions: 
 
1. Concentration. It is commonly known that if one tries to concentrate on a certain object, it 
becomes very difficult to avoid the formation of chains of thoughts unrelated to the intended 
object of concentration. 
2. Imagination. The mind cognitively structures perceived phenomena. It might be important to 
dissolve such structures in order to restructure such phenomena. In this way, the outcome of 
imagination fosters creativity. 
3. Breathing. Breathing techniques to regulate the oxygen level in the blood system are 
especially important for increased sensitivity. 
4. Relaxation. A quiet and aware state of one’s body and mind is important to cultivate. 
5. Observation. The brain’s control function, in order to be constantly aware of one’s state of 
consciousness, requires a sensitive balance between the trance experience and one’s role as 
an observer. 
 
A shamanic state of trance is a form of meditation that causes physiological changes in the 
shaman’s body and the change of his/her level of perception. The performance of meditation 
aims to eliminate all chains of thought that lead the individual away from the object of 
meditation in order to allow a complete focusing on the object of observation. Sometimes it is 
the person who is the object of observation. 
To meditate means to apply various techniques in order to enlarge one’s cognitive capacity in 
such a way that a heightened state of consciousness is achieved. A meditative state allows the 
individual to experience, understand, and interact with the energy field of which one’s body is a 
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part. The shaman’s cathartic journey reaches a climax if the physical body can be liberated from 
cognitive limitations in order to serve the individual as the basis for an ASC in which awareness 
is bound within an energetic dreambody. In this context the term “dreambody” is used as one of 
many possible denominators to describe the conscious perception of a different energetic 
frequency of one’s participation in reality. Other words commonly used to describe such a 
function are Ka, “astral body,’ “double,” “eidolon,” and “ethereal body.” The frequency of the 
dreambody is different from the frequency of the physical body (Mindell 1982: 14): “Just as an 
elementary particle can be seen only indirectly by the streaking effects created by its movements 
in a cloud chamber, so the dreambody can be noticed but not understood in terms of the real 
body. The existence of the dreambody can be macroscopically tested and verified only by its 
effects on the ‘real’ world.” 
An ideological turning point in interpreting energetic matter is given by the different possible 
interpretations of consciousness. Reductionistic theories give little or no credit to the potentiality 
of human consciousness. However, in order to activate the subtle qualities of the dreambody, a 
vital prerequisite appears to be the unrestricted application of consciousness, which is based on a 
volitional activation of neuronal firing that could not be reproduced artificially. Thus, it seems 
that reductionistic methodologies according to their axioms cannot include any research data 
gained from those subtle realms. The observation of such realms depends on accepting a unique 
function of consciousness and awareness.  
Similar methodological differences can be found in quantum physics (Mindell 1982: 16): “The 
gaseous, vibratory, or field-like quality of the dreambody is analogous to the physicist’s 
discovery that the elementary particles of matter are not material particles at all but aspects of the 
field’s qualities. Instead of particles we have relatively high field densities at certain areas in 
space and time. These field densities and their associated discontinuities and intensities 
correspond to what classical physics calls matter.” 
Basically there are three different main tendencies to interpret quantum physical events: (1) 
realistic-mechanical models (such as wave mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, matrix 
mechanics); (2) inductionistic-hypothetical models (such as S-matrix, the Copenhagen 
interpretation, theories of probability); and (3) holistic-dynamic models (such as the topological 
“bootstrap” theory, Bohm’s concept of implicate order). Each of these models can be applied in 
many different ways, depending on additional assumptions based on preferred ideologies (e.g., 
realism or idealism, determinism or indeterminism, instrumentalism or objectivism). No 
physicist would question the validity of quantum mechanical formalism; the difficulties are of 
interpretative nature.  
The two main variables in the interpretation of quantum events are the probabilistic versus 
deterministic theories. In addition to these interpretations of quantum physics, there are also 
holistic theories such as the theory of implicate order (Bohm 1981), which refers to a noncausal 
principle of structure which is contained in each region of space and time. In order to understand 
the implicate order of the universe, we have to accept the assumption of a “holomovement” or 
“holoflux,” which is an immeasurable and undefinable variable that has the function of carrying 
 12
information within the implicate order. 
The holomovement represents a new order that has its beginning not in energy fields or 
elementary particles, but rather in an undivided totality of reality (Bohm 1981: 149): “There is 
the germ of a new notion of order here. This order is not to be understood solely in terms of a 
regular arrangement of objects (e.g., in rows) or as a regular arrangement of events (e.g., in a 
series). Rather, a total order is contained, in some implicit sense, in each region of space and 
time. Now, the word ‘implicit’ is based on the verb ‘to implicate.’ This means ‘to fold inward’ 
(as multiplication means ‘folding many times’). So we may be led to explore the notion that in 
some sense each region contains a total structure ‘enfolded’ within it.” This holoflux or 
holomovement is considered the primary order of the universe which manifests itself in the two 
orders of immanence and unfolding. The problem with Bohm’s theory, however, is the fact that 
there is no explanation for that principle according to which the holomovement operates (Bohm 
& Welwood 1980: 26): “The holomovement is more ‘inward’ than the two orders which are its 
extremes. And beyond all this is that emptiness and fullness which is entirely implicit, which 
cannot be uttered.” 
For Bohm, reality is not equivalent to wave functions defined by mathematical formulas. Rather, 
it is the result of an implicate order that can also be expressed through such formulas. Matter is 
only one possible apparent form of energy: an energy that had been formed because of such 
implicate order. A totally new way of looking at matter is introduced. For example, an electron is 
a manifestation of a holistic immanence that came into existence as matter; at the same time it is 
already replaced by a different immanent structure. This means that on one hand an electron is 
not a thing in a materialistic sense, but a steady manifestation of structure; on the other hand it 
also has the properties of a particle since this partial information of particle also is an integrated 
information of the whole. 
Every moment of the universe is characterized as a projection and simultaneous reprojection of 
the entire information of which this universe consists. We can demonstrate this situation with a 
simple analogy. Imagine the ocean and its waves rolling to the shore. Each wave is effected by 
the previous one, and simultaneously affects the next one. This causality can only be understood 
by considering the entire ocean; however, it does not shed light on one singular wave. Therefore, 
a nonlocal causal principle can be imagined: whatever happens on one particular location of the 
ocean will also effect the entire ocean. 
How can the implicate order possibly provide any information for a theory of trance? The 
connecting link is the function of consciousness. For Bohm, consciousness fulfills a function 
similar to that which a laserbeam does for the hologram. This function is understood as a specific 
characteristic of the holomovement that is contained in all of matter. With such an assumption, 
how can Bohm escape the accusation of regressing to panpsychism, a philosophical theory in 
which it is assumed that there is a psychological aspect present in all things? He used the concept 
of implicate and unfolded order. The interface between matter and consciousness is not the result 
of a transcendent or spiritual force; rather it resembles a holographic image.  
By using the holographic model, Bohm explained that each event within any part of the universe 
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is potentially present in the entire universe. The event-forming conditions are given through the 
holomovement. Eventually these energy forms achieve threshold values which can be perceived 
by human senses. 
For Bohm, consciousness is constructed in such a way that the conscious interface with the 
holoflux forms awareness and consciousness. This is, indeed, a circular definition. Thus in the 
final analysis, Bohm’s theory also is a reductionist theory until a definition is postulated for the 
guiding principle of the holoflux. This particular problem, however, does not effect a theory of 
trance, since Bohm likened consciousness to a laserbeam that interacts with a hologram. This 
theory of consciousness was further developed by Pribram (1986).  
Certainly, one would be going too far to assume that either Bohm or Pribram would support a 
theory of trance based on their scientific findings. Nevertheless, it appears that there is the 
possibility to consciously affect the perception of different structures of the universal hologram. 
In this context, different forms of trance may allow us to perceive different frequencies of reality. 
This is definitely a challenging prospect for any future theory of trance. 
This brief excursion into some methodological possibilities in the study of trance may 
demonstrate that in principle there is an acceptable way to include refined perceptions of reality 
into the general context of scientific research. That this has not yet been done seems to be more 
an ideological problem rather than a data-related one. There is no guarantee that an accumulation 
of data collected by observation by the five senses would lead to a more accurate description of 
reality when compared to a data collection that also includes additional forms of perception such 
as trance. The danger appears to be more at the ideological end. Reductionistic theories depend 
on the assumption that reality can be explained solely in terms of physical laws. To accept the 
possibility that consciousness and awareness might be properties which cannot be manipulated 
externally (e.g., through artificially stimulated neuronal firing) is contradictory to reductionistic 
theories. 
 
Appearance and Reality 
 
Any interpretation of reality will lead to epistemological problems that in the final analysis 
require a pragmatic approach. Such an approach will have bearing on the area of 
intersubjectivity. However, in order to reach any sound conclusions about features of reality, one 
must be attributing reality to some sort of entities, but not restrict one to entities in a physical 
sense. Rather, the understanding of “object” must be expanded in such a way that it is not seen as 
an ultimate conceptual or substantial entity in the puzzle of analyzing reality, but solely a 
possible form of existence available to humankind’s comprehension and perception. In spite of 
any conceptual difficulties that might arise in sharing different or even contrasting schemes 
underlying human experience, a scientist must find some criterion of truth to evaluate the 
attempts to organize such human experiences (Davidson 1973). 
Merely being in the world or experiencing the world may not suffice for understanding the 
world. It is precisely this display of understanding that indicates evolutionary progress. But what 
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are the conditions according to which understanding becomes possible? Is it really necessary to 
assume that concepts (such as mind, consciousness, and thinking) exist, or would it be more 
appropriate to reduce these concepts to the functional level of their presumed physical 
properties? 
A radical empirist immediately would call upon the principle of economy that became known in 
philosophy as Occam’s razor. Thus, it would be preferable to present a parsimonious explanation 
with as few assumptions as possible. However, principles are very patient tools. For example, for 
a radical empirist, Occam’s razor also might be used to cut off any consideration about 
consciousness. On the other hand, a radical idealist could use this principle to deny the existence 
of physical reality, since nature without perception is a rather dull affair (Whitehead 1948: 56): 
“soundless, scentless, colorless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.” 
Scientific philosophy uses clear research guidelines. Scholars interested in philosophic research 
must keep in mind that they will be steadily confronted with the temptation to apply Occam’s 
razor in order to comfort their own limited ability of conceptualization. A methodology can only 
be a tool for investigation. It cannot legitimately be the foundation to select data. Certainly, any 
methodology will affect the selection of data, but it is important to remember that it is due to the 
underlying ideological assumptions that a methodology is enforced. This consideration applies 
for a scientist as well as for a concerned practitioner of trance. The following example will 
demonstrate this assumption. 
In an attempt to develop clear research guidelines, a philosophical movement developed during 
the 1920’s and 1930’s that became known as the Vienna Circle or logical positivism. Here, 
strong emphasis was given to the use and analysis of language. Philosophical questions about 
reality, or the mind-body problem, or questions about consciousness were no longer ontological 
questions that dealt with physical reality. Instead, they became semantic questions. Quine (1960) 
tried to demonstrate that the ascent into language (“semantic ascent”) was not an accident or a 
careless maneuver but one of the last chances to have any criteria to decide upon statements 
about reality. This idea was based on the assumption that all knowledge can be communicated, 
and the means of communication is language.  
A legitimate use of language is given when a proposition can be verified, at least in principle. 
The method of verification, though, “is the occurrence of a particular state-of-affairs, ascertained 
by observation and immediate experience” (Schlick 1979: 157). All definitions must eventually 
end by some demonstration or activity that is intersubjectively accessible which can be verified 
with scientific precision. Physical properties are ideal standards of verification, since at least in 
principal, they are measurable. Their definition depends on the method of measurement. In order 
to escape the necessity to define such terms like “consciousness” or “mind,” a philosophy had 
been developed that became known as “physicalism”: psychological data themselves are now 
defined as physical properties, at least if such data refer to propositions about the physical world 
(e.g., a frequency, a number of vibrations per second). However, if such psychological data refer 
to nonphysical properties (e.g., emotions, ideas), their definition only succeeds as long as 
empirical data from the physical world can be used to describe such properties. This does not 
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necessarily refer to the possibility of whether or not consciousness might exist. It simply 
indicates that one cannot make any meaningful statements about such metaphysical properties. 
For example, Wittgenstein (1974: 3) suggests the following in his Tractatus: “What can be said 
at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.” He 
emphasized that the purpose of all philosophizing is to make language clear and unambiguous. 
This means we must reject all statements for which no method of verification can be found. 
Any proposition that cannot be subjected to a strict measure of verification has been regarded as 
factually meaningless. In this context, the differentiation between appearance and reality no 
longer refers to the differentiation between mental states and physical reality. Rather, the term 
“appearance” designates something like an illusion or wrong observation, whereas the term 
“reality” is used to designate an established fact. As a consequence, consciousness also no longer 
exists as a valid proposition. At least it does not exist as a subject for scientific investigation. 
Any attempts to find an engram – a physical trace of consciousness somewhere within the 
human brain – has been unsuccessful (Segal 1986). So far there has been no method of 
verification (or a method of falsification) to demonstrate the existence of consciousness in a 
physical environment. 
As we see from this example, Occam’s razor had been used to eliminate the discussion about 
consciousness from scientific philosophy, and gave support to those radical claims according to 
which consciousness per se no longer exists. The general difficulty in verifying metaphysical 
claims has led to their exclusion from empirical research within science. As positivistic 
methodology has taken prominence, a selection of information has also taken place which is 
restricted to one particular segment of reality. However, one must take issue with the lack of 
merit in reducing human beings to trivial machines simply out of the requirements of a chosen 
methodology. 
A theory of trance should not be confused with being able to solve discussions about the 
existence of consciousness. Nor, by the same token, is there any need to exclude trance from 
further scientific consideration. The deciding element is whether or not the proposition 
"consciousness" can enhance clarification of scientific issues. 
At the present level of scientific research, a decision about the value of consciousness and 
awareness may not have to be based on facts alone. Rather, it could be viewed as an ethical 
necessity. The ethical imperative would be: “act always as to increase the number of choices” 
(Von Foerster 1981: 307). Such an imperative does not at all favor the idea that consciousness is 
an independently existing soul-substance, alongside physical substances. Such an imperative 
simply maintains the challenge to conceive of possibilities of communication that could enhance 
a meaningful contribution to the concept of reality. Additional systematic research about ASC 
may provide important data for a unified theory of science. However, it is important to 
investigate such data within its own context. If a belief in consciousness would have a catalyzing 
effect as to the quality of investigation, then the methodological framework must be adjusted in 
order to meet such needs. 
 
 16
Conclusion 
 
Shamanic forms of trance and divinatory hallucinations are based on the ontological assumption 
that communication with subtle energetic structures of reality is possible. Scientific research 
does not include such patterns of communication as valid tools to explain physical events. As a 
consequence, consciousness and awareness are seen only as semantic propositions to explain 
certain neural events. I suggest that we consider trance and certain hallucinations as a tool to 
acquire subtle perceptions of reality which can bring substantially new raw data into a 
reconceptualization of reality. Whether or not consciousness exists should not affect our 
recognition of the function of consciousness, which allows an individual to perceive those subtle 
structures of reality that may not be bound by metaphysical ideologies or by macrophysical laws. 
 
Glossary of Terms 
 
Determinism: The assumption that all events, including human actions, are predetermined. 
Dualism: A philosophical theory that assumes objects, events, states or processes are either 
mental or material; neither can be reduced to the other; any philosophical system that divides the 
world into two categories or types of things, or uses two ultimate principles of expalanation, or 
insists that there are two kinds of substances. 
Eliminative Materialism: Similar to physicalism, reality can be strictly examined in terms of 
physical properties. 
Empiricism: (Greek: empeira; experience). A philosophical theory that recognizes experience as 
the only source of knowledge. 
Epistemology: A branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations of knowledge, its 
presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims of knowledge. 
Idealism: (Greek: idéa; something seen, visual aspect). A philosophical theory that knowledge 
of the external world or the material universe is in some important sense created by the mind or 
at least is dependent on the mind. 
Incommensurability: (Latin: commetiri; compare, incomparable). Normally used in 
mathematics. In contemporary philosophy, incommensurability refers to the assumption that 
scientific theories are not always comparable in regard to their claims about veritable 
information. 
Indeterminism: Sometimes referred to as free will, other times as chance. The assumption that 
one is able to choose and act according to the dictates of one’s own will. Also used in the sense 
of “whatever happens by chance cannot happen by necessity.” 
Instrumentalism: A philosophical theory that theories are merely instruments, tools, or 
calculating devices for deriving some observation statements (data); opposed to most realist 
theories of science. 
Logical Positivism: Philosophical ideas put forward by a group of philosophers during the 
1920’s until the 1940’. A systematic search for truth employing empirical knowledge combined 
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with logical and analytical interpretation; all idealistic claims were rejected. 
Logos: Ancient Greek term generally translated as “word,” with many additional connotations 
that are fulfilled by other words in modern languages. The most controversial term included in 
logos is “reason” because it refers to both human and divine reason. 
Mind-Body Problem: The relation between brain and mind has been for many centuries one of 
the most difficult problems, both of philosophy and of science. Several approaches to the 
problem have been proposed without ever reaching a solution. 
Monism: A philosophical theory maintaining that there is only one substance; the unity of all of 
reality is expressed in the unity of things in time, space or in quality. 
Mythos: Ancient Greek term generally translated as “narration” or “fable.” Also understood as 
pictorial creation from the unconscious. 
Objectivism: A philosophical theory that there are certain moral truths that would remain true 
regardless of an individual’s beliefs. 
Occam’s Razor: A methodological principle of parsimony to explain phenomena in order to 
eliminate pseudoexplanatory entities. Nothing is to be assumed necessary in accounting for any 
fact unless it is established by evident experience or evident reasoning. 
Ontology: A philosophical discipline discussing the subject matter of “being”; commonly used 
as the name of a subdivision of metaphysics with the emphasis to consider the more general 
properties of things. In the context of analytic philosophy, the term “ontology” is used to discuss 
relations between intensional and extensional logic. 
Panpsychism: A philosophical theory that there is a psychological aspect present in all things. 
Physicalism: A philosophical theory that every object, state, process or event can be completely 
described and explained by the physical sciences; this includes nonmaterial properties, such a 
gravitational field or electromagnetic radiation as well as mental states. 
Psyche: Greek term often used in the meaning of “life”; also identified with “soul” in the sense 
of the conscious self. Socrates used psyche to identify the rational as well as emotional side of 
personality. 
Rational: (Latin: ratio; reason). Generally designates the specifically human mode of conceptual 
discursive knowledge. In a larger sense, “rational” also includes intellect and the ability to grasp 
knowledge before any process of conceptualization has occurred. 
Realism: A philosophical theory that universals and particulars exist independently of sensory 
experience. In modern philosophy, it is used for the view that material objects exist externally 
and independently of sensory experience. 
Reductionism: The assumption that every theoretical term can be defined in terms of 
observables, or at least in terms of conditional statements. 
Reductive Materialism: The most straightforward of the several materialist theories of mind: 
mental states are physical states of the brain. 
Truth: In philosophy, truth cannot simply be described as “conforming with facts” or 
“agreement with reality.” There are at least four major different theories of truth that take into 
consideration the complexity of human understanding and the problems of perception: coherence 
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theory, correspondence theory, performative theory, and pragmatic theory. 
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i For the non-philosophically trained reader, see the glossary of terms. 
ii This, of course, does not mean that such systematic attempts would not exist. For example, Tart (1975) 
introduces the concept of “state specific sciences.” He develops a systematic approach to utilize 
different states of consciousness for scientific research. In this context, any properly trained observer 
would be capable of participating in a state-specific communication. For Tart, a consensual validation 
of internal phenomena by a trained observer is possible in principle. He challenged the belief that a 
scientist’s observation could be replicated by any intelligent man (p. 213): “I cannot go into a modern 
physicist’s laboratory and confirm his observation. Indeed, his talk of what he has found in his 
experiments would probably seem mystical to me, just as descriptions of internal states sound mystical 
to those with a background in the physical sciences.” Tart encourages the belief that it would be a 
matter of education and training to utilize ASC as systematic tools for scientific research. In spite of this 
valuable information, Tart’s methodology did not take into consideration that internal states of mind 
cause different epistemological problems as opposed to the predictable behavior of invisible physical 
entities as recorded in the physical sciences. 
iii See Noll (1989) for his discussion of neuromythology 
iv The term “success-word” is used in a similar sense as described in Stove (1982: 7): “A journalist will 
often write such a sentence as, ‘The Minister to-day refuted allegations that he had misled Parliament,’ 
when all he means is that the Minister denied these allegations. ‘To refute’ is a verb with ‘success-
grammar’ (in Ryle’s phrase). To say the Minister refuted the allegations is to ascribe to him a certain 
cognitive achievement: that of showing the allegations to be false. ‘To deny,’ on the other hand, has no 
success-grammar. So a journalist who used ‘refuted’ when all he means was ‘denied’ has used a 
success-word, but without intending to convey the idea of success, of cognitive achievement, which is 
part of the word’s meaning.” 
